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Abstract
Increasing resilience is one of the top priorities of global 
economic policy. In a comparison of eight industrial-
ized countries, a quite varied picture emerges. On four 
dimensions of performance (growth, unemployment, 
protection against poverty and distribution), Japan and 
Australia show considerable resilience in the context  
of crisis. France and Italy demonstrate a low level of 
resilience. The United States does little to serve as a role 
model for Europe with regard to resilience; while growth 
rates have been successfully stabilized there, crises have 
been accompanied by increases in inequality. 
The figure examines Germany’s performance in the  
context of crisis. Performance is measured using a pre- 
and post-crisis comparison. In comparison to the aver-
age of the here considered countries, Germany has coped 
with crises well with regard to consequences for distri-
bution and unemployment. The consequences of a crisis 
with regard to poverty risks correspond with the coun-
try-sample average. In past decades, Germany has per-
formed somewhat below the average level with regard to 
stabilizing growth. However, this improved significantly 
with the financial crisis. 
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High values within each of the various dimensions  
indicate a high degree of resilience 
to export-sector crises.  
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1 Resilience – a strategy for economic  
policy making
Increasing economic resilience is one of the top priorities  
for national economies and for the global economy as a 
whole. Also for the G-20 summit in Hamburg, the German 
presidency has placed “Building Resilience” at the top of 
the agenda (G20 Germany 2016).
For good reason, the concept of resilience has become  
one of the guiding principles of economic-policy strategy  
development. If economic crises can never be perfectly 
eliminated even with the most careful preventative policies, 
it is vital to develop capabilities enabling crises to be  
handled as well as possible (Brinkmann et al. 2017). 
But how do major industrialized countries perform today 
with regard to resilience? This analysis examines these 
questions for a specific type of crisis, the export-sector  
crisis. Here, resilience is measured on the basis of pre- and 
post-crisis comparisons of the following four performance 
indicators: the growth rate, the unemployment rate, the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate and the Gini coefficient. This selec-
tion reflects a dual societal objective that includes an ori-
entation toward growth as well as toward social protection 
(“inclusive growth”). 
The resilience test includes all significant export-sector  
crises since the 1970s. This enables the illumination 
of long-term crisis-management patterns within the 
observed economies that are not immediately evident when 
examining individual current crises.
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FIGURE 1: Number of export-sector crises per year
2 Overview of export-sector crises
example, the German exports-to-GDP ratio increased by 
an annual average of 1.29 percentage points between 1970 
and 2016. Against this background, a year with a decline of 
at least 0.25 percentage points represents a significant set-
back relative to the export-growth trend. Figure 1 shows 
the yearly number of economic crises as identified in this 
way for the G-7 countries and Australia. Significant clusters 
can be observed during the years of the oil crises, the dot-
com crisis and the global financial and economic crisis. 
Over recent decades, the industrialized world has repeatedly 
been shaken by external-sector shocks. In order to com-
pare the degree to which countries have individually been 
affected by crises, a uniform definition of the crisis event  
is useful. An export-sector crisis is defined here as a decline 
in exports relative to GDP of at least a quarter of a per-
centage point. This seemingly moderate deterioration in 
export performance is to be interpreted in the context of 
the strong growth in world trade over recent decades. For 
       
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.  
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The crises vary in strength across the countries. The total 
number of crises varies between a high number in Italy, 
which has been particularly strongly affected, and only two 
crises in the case of France. 
TABLE 1: Number of export-sector crises per country
Country Crisis period Number
Australia 1981, 1983, 2003 3
Germany 1975, 1993, 2009 3
France 1975, 2009 2
United Kingdom 1975, 2007, 2009 3
Italy 1980, 1991, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009 7
Japan 1986, 1998, 2001, 2009 4
Canada 1974, 1975, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2009 6
United States 1982, 2001, 2009 3
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.
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Methodology of pre- and post-crisis 
comparison
An economy’s resilience is reflected in its performance 
during and in the aftermath of a crisis. In order to do jus-
tice to the societal objective of inclusive growth, the fol-
lowing evaluation of performance includes four measures 
of welfare: the growth rate of the real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), the unemployment rate, the at-risk-of-poverty 
rate, and the Gini coefficient for disposable income. 
3 Resilience in cross-country comparison
An examination of resilience should be oriented toward  
the medium term. A high degree of resilience is thus demon-
strated if, in the event of a crisis, recovery can be achieved 
after a few years even after a significant performance degra-
dation. For this reason, resilience in the following discussion 
will be evaluated on the basis of a medium-term performance 
comparison. For example, GDP growth averaged across the 
first five post-crisis years will be compared with the five-
year average before the crisis. Pre- and post-crisis trends for 
the unemployment rate, the Gini coefficient and the at-risk-
of-poverty rate will be compared in a similar fashion. 
FIGURE 2: Crisis resilience of a hypothetical country
 hypothetical country      Average of countries      
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.  
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FIGURE 3: Cross-country comparison of resilience to export-sector crises
 Country X      Average of countries      A  GDP     B  Unemployment rate      C  Gini coefficient     D  At-risk-of-poverty-rate 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
Deutschland 1,414988995 88,80316162 84,95695496 42,5
Länderdurchschnitt 37,92320582 56,0801754 64,32161844 42,54861116
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In order to ensure comparability between the performance 
dimensions, values for each dimension were normalized 
on a 0 to 100 scale, on which 100 represents the best and 
0 the worst value in cross-country comparison. Figure 2 
shows this using a hypothetical country X. In this country, 
the GPD shows the strongest development in comparison 
to the average of all countries. By contrast, the value for 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate stands at 0, which means that 
in comparison to the other countries, poverty has either 
grown the most or declined the least. The two other perfor-
mance measures fall close to the average of all countries.  
In general, the larger the surface area of the country’s 
four-pointed figure, the more strongly the affected econ-
omy was able to demonstrate its resilience. 
Cross-country comparison
Using the above-outlined methodology, Figure 3 indicates 
how the G-7 countries and Australia have performed under 
conditions of export-sector crisis across each of the four 
welfare dimensions. 
Even at first glance, it is clear that Australia and Japan are 
particularly robust countries that cope with export-sector  
crises comparatively well (in Japan’s case, with some qual-
ifications with regard to the risk of poverty). By contrast, 
France’s profile is particularly unsatisfactory. In past years, 
this country has had little with which to combat exter-
nal shocks; crisis consequences were evident across all four 
welfare dimensions even years after the end of a crisis. 
However, it should be noted that France was also affected 
by comparatively few crises (1975 and 2009). For Italy, also 
this analysis points to notorious weaknesses with regard to 
growth. The country has experienced the largest compar-
ative declines in growth under conditions of export-sec-
tor crisis; however, it performs relatively well on the other 
welfare indicators. The United States also has a striking 
profile. Here, possibly due to active countercyclical poli-
cies, long-term crisis-related growth declines have been 
avoided. However, crises do leave typically long-lasting 
traces in the United States in the form of rising income  
inequality. 
Germany’s crisis resilience appears at first glance to be 
very similar to that of Italy. Distribution and the labor mar-
ket develop at above-average rates in pre- and post-crisis 
comparison, while the growth consequences of export- 
sector shocks last longer than in the other countries being 
compared. Here, however, an in-depth analysis indicates  
a change over the course of time. Germany’s poor crisis 
performance with regard to growth was primarily in evi-
dence during the 1975 and 1993 crises. In contrast, Ger-
many handled its last crisis (the 2009 financial crisis)  
significantly better than the country average, even with 
regard to GDP growth. After the 2009 crisis, GDP growth 
was about 0.2 percentage points above its rate in the pre-
crisis period, while for the other economies, it had fallen  
by about 0.3 percentage points. 
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4 Resilience-promoting factors
ICT investment to gross fixed-capital formation: A strong 
innovation orientation on the part of the state and busi-
nesses should help to compensate for crisis-related slumps 
in export markets through new processes and products. 
In an examination of how these potential determinants of 
resilience manifest within countries with particularly high 
or low levels of resilience, the following findings emerge: 
Countries with high resilience: As a very resilient country, 
Australia stands out with very low levels of state spending 
and a large amount of financial flexibility. Innovation ori-
entation is above average for both the state and businesses. 
In contrast, the country is comparatively heavily regulated, 
and is at an average level with regard to its population’s 
education level. Japan scores strongly with a very high edu-
cation level among its populace. In contrast, the country  
is one of the most heavily indebted countries in the consid-
ered selection, despite a comparatively small public-spend-
ing ratio (Japan has also had a debt burden greater than 
Italy’s since the end of the 1990s). 
Countries with low resilience: As the least resilient country, 
France has two major handicaps with respect to these indi-
cators. It is the country with the highest density of regu-
lation, and also has the largest state sector. With regard to 
innovation orientation, a mixed picture emerges: State R&D 
efforts are strong, but the share of ICT within the country’s 
private-sector equipment investment is below average. 
Italy is the textbook case of a country that occupies a very 
low position across all resilience indicators, while showing 
a very high degree of regulation, a poor education perfor-
mance, a high level of state debt and a low innovation  
orientation. 
Germany: With regard to the resilience factors, Germany 
shows only minimal variations from the country aver-
ages. The country has an above-average regulation den-
sity, which however remains far from the level reached by 
France or Italy. The below-average education level, meas-
The reasons for these great differences in resilience 
between the industrialized countries have not been ade-
quately understood to date. In the following, a number  
of country characteristics will be presented in an explora-
tory way, each of which could potentially contribute to  
an explanation:
Education level within the population, measured by the 
share of work force with tertiary education: Well-edu-
cated employees can be flexibly deployed, which increases 
the adaptive capability of an economy overall (Sondermann 
2016).
The degree of regulation, as measured by the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom: A high degree of regulation hinders adap-
tation to changed circumstances. However, a high level of 
regulatory protection against dismissal for workers can 
potentially limit the short-term employment consequences 
of a crisis. 
Size of state, measured by the ratio of state expenditure  
to GDP: A high public-spending ratio can on the one hand 
reinforce automatic stabilization in times of economic 
decline, and thus limit the negative consequences of a  
crisis. For example, Afonso et al. (2010) find a positive  
relationship between this factor and an even distribution 
of wealth. On the other hand, a high public-spending ratio 
comes at the cost of the private sector with its market- 
oriented adaptive capacities. 
Fiscal flexibility, measured by the ratio of public debt to GDP: 
A high degree of flexibility improves the opportunity to 
engage in countercyclical stabilization policy, and should 
thus help to limit the negative growth and employment 
consequences of a temporary crisis. In addition, it improves 
the ability to provide security to groups hit particularly 
hard by the crisis. 
An orientation toward innovation, measured by the ratio of 
state-funded R&D expenditure to GDP, and the ratio of 
12
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ured by the tertiary education rate, must be seen in the 
light of the large significance of the strong dual educational 
systems. The state-financed R&D expenditures are at the 
top margin of the comparison. In contrast, Germany figures 
among the countries with relatively low levels of ICT at the 
point in time before earlier crises.
TABLE 2: Strength of resilience-promoting factors 
Share of population with  
tertiary education
Economic Freedom  
Index
Public spending  
(as % of GDP)
Australia 51.90 16.57 0.00
Canada 100.00 97.24 37.79
France 47.84 0.00 100.00
Germany 37.42 38.67 57.18
Italy 0.00 3.04 74.53
Japan 92.65 33.15 18.81
Great Britain 65.36 100.00 35.32
United States 82.34 87.29 1.79
 Public debt  
(as % of GDP)
State-funded R&D expenditures  
(as % of GDP)
ICT investments  
(as % of gross capital formation)
Australia 0.00 55.58 69.96
Canada 56.35 23.73 37.12
France 37.21 100.00 26.53
Germany 31.27 96.71  15.12
Italy 100.00 7.25 0.00
Japan 95.75 12.99 3.01
Great Britain 31.66 0.00 75.30
United States 34.54 89.82 100.00
Notes: All indicators are normalized on a 0 to 100 scale. Observations are made for the third (or if not available, the second) year before each crisis,  
and subsequently consolidated as an average per country across all its crisis episodes.  
The current manifestation of the indicators can thus differ significantly from these historical average values in the run-up to crises taking place since the 1970s. 
Source: OECD und Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom Index).
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5 Looking for resilience strategies
objectives must also be taken into account. The type of 
resilience shown by the United States, where GDP is stabi-
lized but crises are associated with increases in inequality, 
would be a politically acceptable blueprint for very few EU 
countries. 
The major industrialized countries differ significantly from 
one another with regard to their resilience in the face of 
economic crises. Japan and Australia display good perfor-
mance with regard to nearly all welfare measures. In Ger-
many, Italy and Canada, unemployment figures and the 
distribution of wealth (measured by the Gini coefficient) 
react more robustly to crises than is the case in other coun-
tries; however, GDP declines to an above-average extent.  
A similar tendency can be observed for the United Kingdom, 
although unemployment figures rise more strongly there. 
Measures of welfare in the United States show a near-mir-
ror-image development compared to trends in the Euro-
pean economies; in the United States, GDP is successfully 
and rapidly stabilized, but crises are associated with a sig-
nificant increase in inequality. France shows particularly 
unfavorable development on all welfare measures, once 
again underlining the challenges faced by the new French 
president with regard to necessary reform policies. 
The comparison of potential resilience-relevant character-
istics, from educational levels to public debt to innovation 
orientation, fails to provide a uniform picture. In particu-
lar, a high regulatory density is associated with lower resil-
ience only for certain countries – as in the case of France 
and Italy. Particularly resilient states such as Japan and 
Australia were also characterized by a comparatively high 
degree of regulation in the run-up to past crises. How-
ever, the combination of a high regulatory density with a 
high public-spending ratio is always associated with a low 
level of resilience. The combination of high levels of pub-
lic spending and far-reaching regulations apparently influ-
ences an economy’s adaptive capability in a particularly 
negative way. 
Against the background of these insights, any “one-size-
fits-all” approach to the development of resilience strat-
egies would seem to be misguided. Analyses of individual 
countries’ strengths and weaknesses are needed in order  
to understand the factors contributing to a poor ability  
to cope with crises. In this regard, differences in societal  
14
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“Inclusive Growth for Ger-
many” is a publication series 
from the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Shaping Sustainable Economies pro-
gram. The German economy is as strong 
as ever. But growth in recent years has not been 
inclusive. Inequalities between groups of people, 
generations and regions have increased. In order 
to ensure the continuing success of the social-mar-
ket-economy model, we must we must rethink the 
relationship between growth and a socially inclu-
sive society. The series contributes to this impor-
tant debate by analyzing current developments 
and offering feasible recommendations for action.  
Following the tradition of its founder, Reinhard 
Mohn, the Bertelsmann Stiftung is committed to 
the common welfare. It sees itself as an agent of 
social change, and supports the goal of a sustaina-
ble society. The Stiftung is independent and non-
partisan.
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